Policing occurs in insect, animal and human societies, where it is used as a conditional strategy to prevent cheating and enforce cooperation. Recently, it has been suggested that policing might 24 even be relevant in enforcing cooperation in much simpler organisms such as bacteria. Here, we used individual-based modelling to develop an evolutionary concept for policing in bacteria, 26 and identify the conditions under which it can be adaptive. We modelled interactions between cooperators, producing a beneficial public good, cheaters exploiting the public good without 28 contributing to it, and public good producing policers that secrete a toxin to selectively target cheaters. We found that toxin-mediated policing is favored when (i) toxins are potent and 30 durable, (ii) cheap to produce, (iii) cell and public good diffusion is intermediate, and (iv) toxins diffuse farther than the public good. Overall, we show that toxin-mediated policing can enforce 32 cooperation, but the parameter space where it is beneficial seems quite narrow. Moreover, we found that policing decays when the genetic linkage between public good and toxin production 34 breaks. This is because policing is itself a public good, offering protection to toxin-resistant mutants that still produce public goods, yet no longer invest in toxins. Our work suggests that 36 very specific environmental conditions are required for genetically fixed policing mechanisms to evolve in bacteria, and offers empirically testable predictions for their evolutionary stability. 38
Introduction 40
Cooperation, a process where individuals act to increase the fitness of others at an immediate cost to themselves, is common across the tree of life (Sachs et al. 2004 ; West et al. 2007b) . 42
While cooperation is widespread in humans (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) 
54
Although cooperation is thought to provide benefits for the collective as a whole, it is intrinsically vulnerable to exploitation by cheating mutants, which benefit from the cooperative 56 acts performed by others, but refrain from contributing themselves to the welfare of the group (Ghoul et al. 2014 ). Thus, there has been great interest in identifying mechanisms that maintain 58 cooperation and prevent the invasion of cheaters (West et For example, Wang et al. (2015) showed that in the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas 76 aeruginosa, the synthesis of a publicly shareable protease is regulatorily coupled to the synthesis of the toxin cyanide in such a way that cheaters, deficient for protease production, 78 simultaneously lose immunity against cyanide. Thus, the costly synthesis of a harmful toxin, which selectively targets non-cooperative cheaters, can be understood as a policing mechanism. 80 While it seems intriguing that organisms as simple as bacteria can perform policing behavior, multiple questions regarding the evolution of microbial policing have remained unaddressed. 82
For one thing, we know little about the environmental conditions promoting policing via toxin production. In this context, one would expect that the spatial structure of the environment, 84 which affects the diffusion of cells, public goods and toxins, should play a crucial role (Driscoll and Pepper 2010; Inglis et al. 2011; Dobay et al. 2014) . Moreover, it is unknown how potent a 86 toxin must be and how much it can cost in order to efficiently fight cheaters. Finally, it remains 5 unclear whether policing is an evolutionary stable strategy or whether non-policing cooperators, 88 which are immune against toxins can exploit policers as second order cheaters (Inglis et al. 2014 ), as it is the case in higher organisms (Boyd et al. 2003) . 90
Here, we address these issues by using realistic individual-based models that simulate 92 interactions between cooperating, policing and cheating bacteria on a toroidal two-dimensional surface (Dobay et al. 2014) . In our in-silico approach, bacteria are modeled as discs and seeded 94 in low numbers onto the surface of their habitat, where they can consume resources, grow, divide, disperse, and secrete compounds according to specified parameters. Important to note 96 is that both bacteria and public good molecules are modelled as individual agents and are free to diffuse on a continuous landscape, closely mimicking biological conditions (Figs. 1 + S1). 98
For our main analysis, we considered two bacterial strains that match those used in the empirical policing paper by Wang et al. (2015) . Specifically, we implemented a policing strain P that 100 produces a public good together with a tightly linked toxin and an immunity protein; and a cheating strain C that is deficient for public good production and, due to the regulatory linkage, 102 is also unable to produce the toxin and its immunity protein. We further considered a cooperating control wildtype strain W, which produces the public good but features no policing 104 mechanism. Finally, we also considered a second-order policing cheater R, which produces the public good and the immunity protein, but not the toxin. For this strain, we assume that the 106 genetic linkage between the three traits can be broken, such that R directly evolves from P.
108
In a first set of simulations, we examined the performance of the cooperator, cheater and policing strains in monoculture to understand how the relative costs and benefits of public good 110 and toxin production affect strain fitness. Next, we competed wildtype cooperators against 6 cheaters across a range of bacterial and public good diffusion coefficients to determine the 112 parameter space where cooperation is favored in the absence of policing (Dobay et al. 2014 ).
Subsequently, we competed the cheater against the policing strain across the same parameter 114 space, to test whether policing extends the range of conditions across which cooperation is favored, and to identify properties of the toxin system (diffusion, potency, durability) to 116 guarantee efficient policing. Finally, we simulated the situation where toxin-resistant public good producers evolve from the policing strain, and ask whether policing via toxin production 118 itself constitutes an exploitable public good.
120

Methods
IN-SILICO HABITAT AND BACTERIA 122
The in-silico habitat consists of a two-dimensional continuous toroidal surface, with no boundaries. The size of the surface is 60 x 60 µm 2 = 3,600 µm 2 . Bacteria are modeled as discs 124 with an initial radius r of 0.5 µm. Bacteria can consume resources, which are unlimited in our system, grow at a basic growth rate µ, and divide when reaching the threshold radius of 1.0 µm. 126 Bacteria can disperse on the landscape according to a specific cell diffusion coefficient Dc (µm 2 /s), and are not bound to a grid, but can freely move on the continuous landscape (i.e. we 128 used an off-lattice model with double-precision floating-point format). At the beginning of a simulation, we randomly seed one founder bacteria of each strain onto the surface, free to grow 130 and divide according to its life cycle (see Figs. 1 + S1 for a visualization).
132
In addition to the basic growth rate µ, the growth of a bacterium is influenced by its social behavior and its interaction with other community members. Costs, reducing growth, incur to 134 individuals producing public goods, toxins and immunity proteins. Additional costs incur to 7 susceptible cells taking up toxins. The uptake of a public good, meanwhile, has a positive effect 136 on growth for the beneficiary. Accordingly, the growth of our four strains W (public good producing wildtype strain), P (policing strain), C (toxin-sensitive cheating strain), and R 138 (second-order toxin-resistant cheater strain) are defined by the following set of functions: where ,-, 345 , 678 are the production costs per public good, toxin and the immunity protein, respectively. The term ∑ 1 stands for the number of public goods consumed by an individual 146 and b for the benefit derived from this action. The term ∑ ; represents the number of consumed toxins. Toxins decrease the overall growth rate and lead to death when they accumulate beyond 148 the threshold value = . The parameter = can thus be understood as a measure of toxin potency.
The negative effect toxins have on growth is further defined by the latency parameter κ. If 150 κ = 1.0 then there is no latency and each toxin molecule has a linear additive negative effect on growth rate ( Fig. S2 ). With κ > 1.0, susceptible cells can tolerate toxins at low uptake rates, 152 while the negative effects of toxins on growth accelerate with increased toxin uptake. This accounts for the common phenomenon that bacteria possess non-specific resistant mechanisms 154 8 (e.g. efflux pumps), thereby often tolerating low toxin concentrations (Fernández and Hancock 2012; Nikaido and Pagès 2012) . 156
The public good producing strains W and P constitutively secrete one molecule per time step, 158
whereas P additionally secretes toxins at the same rate. The diffusion of cells, public goods and toxins (described by the diffusion coefficients D , ,-and 345 , respectively) were modeled 160 according to a Gaussian random walk, with a Gaussian random number generator based on the Box-Muller transform that converts uniformly distributed random numbers to normally 162 distributed random numbers. Following diffusion, public goods and toxins were consumed whenever there was co-localization of molecules and cells. 164
Both, public goods and toxins were represented by points on the landscape up to the precision 166 of the computer (double precision) (Figs. 1 + S1). The molecules remain in the simulation until they were either consumed or decayed. The probability of decaying was determined by a 168 durability value and an exponential decay function
is the current lifespan of a molecule and = 0.1 the steepness of the decay. 170
On our off-lattice landscape, individuals can physically overlap following cell growth and 172 diffusion. To remove the overlaps, we implemented a procedure where cells are moved slightly apart from each other by a random factor scaled by a maximum pulling distance. In a final step, 174 our stimulation involves a life-dead-control of each individual followed by the removal of dead cells that have passed the toxin threshold value = . Fig. 2 depicts the order in which all the 176 actions in our simulation were executed per time step (representing one second). This 9 simulation cycle continues until the total number of cells reaches the carrying capacity of K = 178 1000 cells. For each of the simulated parameter settings, we performed 50 independent replicates. At each time step, we recorded the relative strain frequency. At the end of a 180 simulation, we measured the final strain frequencies, the mean time between two cell divisions, and the per capita public good and toxin uptake for each strain. 182 Table 1 provides an overview of all the parameters in our simulations and the value ranges explored. One key focus of our study is to understand how cell dispersal and molecule diffusion 186 affect cooperation and policing. For cell dispersal D , we considered active but random bacterial motility, and varied this parameter from 0 µm 2 /s (no dispersal) to 3.5 µm 2 /s (high dispersal) in 188 steps of 0.5. For molecule diffusion ,-and 345 , we implemented passive random diffusion processes and varied parameters from 1.0 µm 2 /s (low diffusion) to 7.0 µm 2 /s (high diffusion) 190 in steps of one. Another important aim of our study is to explore how toxin properties affect policing. In addition to toxin diffusion, we varied: (a) toxin durability 345 from 50 (rapid 192 decay) to 500 (intermediate decay) to 5000 (low decay) time steps; (b) toxin threshold = from 600 (few molecules required to kill) to 1800 (many molecules required to kill) in steps of 400; 194 and (c) toxin latency κ from 1.0 (low tolerance and immediate linear adverse effect) to 6.0 (high tolerance and delayed exponential adverse effect) in steps of 0.5. 196
EXPLORED PARAMETER SPACE 184
Finally, the outcome of our simulations necessarily depends on the cost and benefit parameters. 198
We implemented a basic growth µ to ensure that all cells can grow even if they do not produce public goods. This ensures that cells can only die because of toxins and not because they 200 experience negative growth. µ = 1.0 results in cell division occurring every 1,200 time steps, in the absence of molecule secretion. We fixed the cost and benefit of public good production to 202 ,-= 0.001 and b = 0.01. These values are based on our previous experience with the system (Dobay et al. 2014 ) and ensure that public production generates a substantial net fitness benefit, 204 thus significantly reducing cell division time (see also Fig. 3 ). Of key interest is how costly policing ( 345T678 ) can be relative to ,-in order to maintain a net benefit of cooperation. To 206 address this question, we gradually varied the cost ratio of these two traits [ ,-/( 345 + 678 )] from 0.25 to 4.0. For all simulations, we assumed 345 = 678 . 208
STRAIN PERFORMANCE IN MONOCULTURE 210
In a first set of simulations, we assessed the performance of the strains W (wildtype cooperator) P (policing cooperator) and C (public-good cheater) in monoculture. These assays allow us to 212 quantify (i) the net benefit of cooperation, and (ii) the acceptable boundary costs of policing to ensure a net benefit of cooperation. A net benefit of cooperation is given when the policing 214 strain P grows better than strain C, which neither produces public goods nor toxins. Because we know that cell dispersal and secreted molecule diffusion influence the efficiency of 216 cooperation (Dobay et al. 2014), we performed simulations under three different diffusivity regimes, including high ( D = 4.0 µm 2 /s, ,-= 345 = 7.0 µm 2 /s), medium ( D = 2.0 µm 2 /s, ,-218 = 345 = 3.5 µm 2 /s) and low ( D = 0.1 µm 2 /s, ,-= 345 = 1.0 µm 2 /s) diffusivity. We then compared the time needed by the three strains to reach carrying capacity. 220
PAIRWISE STRAIN COMPETITION 222
We first simulated competitions between the strains W and C across the indicated range of dispersal and diffusion parameters to understand the conditions under which cooperation can 224 be maintained in the absence of policing. Next, we competed P against C. In this scenario, C can still exploit the public good produced by P, but at the same time is harmed by the toxins 226 secreted by this opponent. In a first set of simulations, we implemented intermediate default toxin properties ( 345 = 4.0 µm 2 /s, 345 = 500 s, = = 1000, and κ = 3.5) to examine whether 228 policing extends the range of conditions across which cooperation is favored. In a second set of simulations, we then individually manipulated each of the four different toxin properties to 230 identify the features required for toxin-mediated policing to be efficient.
232
THREE-WAY STRAIN INTERACTIONS
To examine what happens when the genetic linkage between cooperation and policing breaks, 234
we performed three-way competitions between strains P, C, and R. The latter strain no longer produces the toxin, but is resistant to it. Because we do not necessarily expect an overall winner 236 in these competitions, as strain frequency could potentially follow cyclical patterns (Kerr et al. 2002) , we extended our simulation code by implementing a random cell removal event, which 238 is activated as soon as more than 30 % of the surface is covered with cells. This allowed us to keep population size at roughly K/2, and to follow strain frequency over extended periods of 240 time (i.e. 80,000 time steps).
242
Results
STRAIN PERFORMANCE IN MONOCULTURE 244
The growth of strain C (neither producing public goods nor toxins) was not affected by the diffusivity of the environment, and was solely determined by the basic growth rate µ, reaching 246 carrying capacity after 12,000 time steps ( Fig. 3 ). Strain W (producing public goods) grew significantly better than C, demonstrating the benefit of public goods cooperation. The growth 248 of this strain was reduced in more diffusive environments, where the likelihood of public good sharing and consumption declines. The performance of strain P (producing toxins in addition 250 to public goods) greatly varied both in response to the relative costs of policing and the diffusivity of the environment. In environments characterized by low diffusion, P always 252 outperformed C even when the cost of toxin production was four times higher than the cost of public good production (triangles in Fig. 3 ). This was no longer the case in environments 254 characterized by intermediate (diamonds in Fig. 3 ) or high diffusivity (dots in Fig. 3) , where P only grew better than C when toxins were cheaper than public goods. If this condition was not 256 met, then the high costs of policing combined with reduced public good consumption decreased cell growth to a point that prevented populations from reaching carrying capacity. 258
Interestingly, the relationship between the cost ratio ,-/( 345 + 678 ) and the time needed to 260 reach carrying capacity (τ W ) was best captured by the Monod equation (Monod 1949 ), a hyperbolic equation initially used to explain the exponential growth rate as a function of nutrient 262 concentration. Applied to our system, we found that the function
provides a fair approximation to relate to τ W , where R W represents the ratio limit for reaching 264 carrying capacity and R Z the time at which the carrying capacity is half the maximum (Fig. S3 ).
266
LOW CELL DISPERSAL FAVORS COOPERATION WITHOUT POLICING
When competing W against C without a policing mechanism in place, cooperation was only 268 strongly favored when cells did not disperse (Fig. 4A) . In other words, if cooperator cells grew as microcolonies, physically separated from the cheaters, then efficient public good sharing 270 among cooperators is promoted. We further found that cooperators and cheaters could coexist 13 when cell and public good diffusion was low, but greater than zero (Fig. 4A ). Under all other 272 conditions, cheaters strongly dominated the community and pushed cooperators to very low frequencies. These results are in line with our previous simulations, showing that there is only 274 a narrow parameter space within which public good cooperation is favored (Dobay et al. 2014 ).
276
TOXIN-MEDIATED POLICING HAS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFECTS FOR COOPERATION 278
The introduction of a policing mechanism, which operates via the secretion of a toxin that selectively targets cheaters, had multiple dramatic effects on the competitive outcome between 280 the cheater C and the cooperating policer P (Fig. 4B) . Policing strongly increased selection for cooperation under conditions where cooperators could previously only coexist with cheaters 282 (compare Fig. 4A and 4B for combinations of low public good diffusion and cell dispersal).
This finding demonstrates that policing can indeed extend the parameter space across which 284 cooperation is favored. Conversely, we found that policing also had negative effects and drastically accelerated selection against cooperation, especially under conditions where 286 cheaters previously experienced only a moderate selective advantage (compare Fig. 4A and 4B for combinations of intermediate public good diffusion and cell dispersal). These two opposing 288 effects led to a sharp transition between conditions that either completely favor P or C, leaving very few conditions where coexistence between the two strains is possible. 290
HOW TOXIN PROPERTIES AFFECT POLICING EFFICIENCY 292
We found that higher toxin diffusion 345 significantly increased selection for cooperation ( Fig.   5A , 5E and 5B), especially under conditions of intermediate public good diffusion and cell 294 dispersal. These results show that policing is particularly efficient when toxins are sent away to 14 target more distant competitors whilst keeping the public good more local for preferential 296 sharing among producers. Our simulations further revealed that high toxin durability 345 increases policing efficiency and thus selection for cooperation ( Fig. 5C, 5E, 5D ). These 298 findings can be explained by the fact that more durable toxins are more likely to reach target cells. Next, we examined the role of toxin potency = (i.e. the number of toxins needed to kill 300 a target cell), and found that high potency is crucial for policing to promote cooperation ( Fig.   5F , 5E, 5G). While this finding seems trivial at first sight, the dramatic effects we observed 302 when decreasing toxin potency are remarkable. For instance, a reduction of toxin potency by 45 % (from θ` = 1000 to = 1800) already completely negated any benefit of policing, and even 304 increased the parameter space across which cooperation was selected against. Finally, we explored the role of toxin latency κ for policing. Toxin latency is a measure of target cell 306 tolerance: with low values of κ, the fitness of target cells is immediately affected in a linear way, whereas large values of κ mean that target cells can tolerate a certain level of toxins and 308 negative effects only kick in later, but accelerate with higher toxin uptake rates (Figs. S2). We found that low κ values dramatically increased the efiiciency of policing and selection for 310 cooperation (Fig. 5H, 5E, 5I ).
312
POLICING GOES EXTINCT WHEN THE GENETIC LINKAGE BETWEEN TRAITS BREAKS 314
Next, we simulated the case where the genetic linkage between cooperation and policing breaks.
Specifically, we studied the performance of strain R, which evolved directly from P by losing 316 toxin production but keeping resistance, in competition with P and C across a range of intermediate environmental diffusivities. We found that the presence of R consistently drove P 318 to extinction under all environmental conditions tested (Fig. 6 ). Our simulations, which kept populations at half the carrying capacity (K/2 ~ 500 cells) for an extended period of time 320 (roughly 10 times longer than in the previous pairwise competition assays), allowed us to distinguish three distinct competition phases. The first phase comprises the time frame in which 322 the community grows from three cells to K/2. During this phase, we observed cyclical fluctuations of strain frequencies with a general tendency for C to increase, P to decrease, and 324 R to remain stable. The cyclical patterns observed here are reminiscent of the rock-paper- pronounced dip in C frequency accompanied by a strong increase in R frequency, and a moderate increase in P frequency in eight of the nine diffusion conditions (Fig. 6 ). This pattern 330 is most likely explained by the accumulation of toxins in the environment, which efficiently suppressed C, but at the same time gave R leverage, as it could benefit from the effect of 332 policing without paying the cost for it. During the third phase, we observed the extinction of P, the concomitant recovery of C followed by a decrease of R (Fig. 6 ). These patterns arise because 334 as P decreases, toxin concentration declines allowing the recovery of C, which then efficiently exploit the public goods produced by R. In all cases, our simulations returned to a simple 336 cooperator-cheater scenario, with the relative success of the two strategies being determined by the diffusivity of the environment (similar to the results in Fig. 4A ). 338 could also be an effective way to enforce cooperation in groups of microbes, sharing beneficial public goods. In our models, policing is exerted via the secretion of a toxin that specifically 346 targets cheater cells, which do not contribute to the pool of public goods. Our simulations reveal that policing is most conducive under conditions of intermediate cell dispersal and public good 348 diffusion, where it can extend the parameter space, under which cooperation is favored. We further found that an effective policing mechanism entails a toxin that is: (i) cheaper to produce 350 than the public good; (ii) more diffusible than the public good in order to effectively reach 2007c). For instance, in the case of P. aeruginosa it is well conceivable that cyanide primarily serves as a broad-spectrum toxin to target inter-specific competitors under high cell density 386 (Bernier et al. 2016 ). This might be the reason why the expression of cyanide is controlled by quorum sensing, and why it is regulatorily linked to other public good traits, such as protease 388 production, whose expression is also controlled in a density-dependent manner (Darch et al. 2012) . Consequently, the observed cyanide-mediated policing exerted by wildtype strains on 390 protease-deficient strains could be a mere by-product of this regulatory linkage. Alternatively, it is also possible that an initial co-incidental regulatory linkage between cyanide and protease 392 later proved useful as a policing mechanism and evolved as such through cooption (Foster 2011 ). Clearly, further research is needed to uncover the evolutionary history of these putative 394 policing mechanisms, and care must be taken to distinguish between mechanistic (proximate) and evolutionary (ultimate) explanation of observed behavioral patterns (West et al. 2007c) . 396
Discussion
The potential policing mechanisms reported for microbes and the one implemented in our 398 simulations differ in one important aspect from the policing systems found in higher organisms. Specifically, the difference is that the microbial policing mechanisms are genetically fixed (i.e. 400 strains are either cooperating policers or cheaters), whereas in higher organisms policing is perceived as a conditional strategy, which can be applied to sanction cheaters only if required 402 conditional behaviors, and it is thus not surprising that cheating, cooperating and policing strategies are genetically fixed in these organisms. Nonetheless, we argue that it seems fair to 410 use the term 'policing' for the reported behaviors, but also to keep in mind the difference between conditional and fixed strategies. batch-culture growth, where simulations stop when populations reach the carrying capacity K = 1000 (solid lines); and continuous growth in a chemostat, where simulations stop after a given time period (dashed lines). To guarantee continuous growth, the chemostat cycle comprised a random cell removal mechanism, such that population size was kept constant at K/2. Each box describes a key element in a cell's life cycle, affecting its fitness: i.e. cells grew according their fitness equations (see main text) and divided when reaching the threshold radius of 1 µm (two times the initial radius). Since cells are free to move on a continuous landscape, they can overlap following diffusion. To remove cell overlap, we used a procedure based on the physics of hard-core interactions used in molecular dynamics and cell elasticity. We varied toxin diffusion 345 , toxin durability 345 , toxin potency = and toxin latency k across a range of values (see Table 1 ) and show here heat maps of the frequency of the cooperator strain after Figure S3 . Monod's equation explains the relationship between the relative cost of policing and strain fitness. We simulated the growth of the policing strain (producing a toxin and a public good) in monoculture for a range of ,-/( 345 + 678 ) ratios, under three different diffusion regimes. We kept the cost of public good production constant at ,-= 0.001, while varying the cost of toxins ( 345 + 678 ) from 0.00025 to 0.004. The fitness of the policing strain (measured as the time required to reach carrying capacity) declined with higher relative toxin costs. The decline was adequately captured by 
